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No Easy Walk: Advancing Refugee
Protection in South Africa
Jeff Handmaker

South Africa only began accepting individual applications
for political asylum in 1994. A policy designed to recognize
former Mozambican refugees for the purposes of a repatriation program became the (awkward) basis of the asylum
procedure up until April 2000. Criticized by some, a lively
discussion raising often-contradictory views began in 1996,
leading to a policy reform process culminating in the Refugees Act in December 1998. The Act only came into force
at the beginning of April 2000. This article analyzes the
process of policy development in South Africa, focusing on
practical and theoretical challenges facing the government
in the implementation of the new Act. Special attention is
given to temporary protection, the proposed containment
of applicants in reception centers, the arbitrary manner in
which asylum is currently determined, and inconsistencies
between the interfacing of the Refugees Act and the proposed
immigration legislation. The paper concludes by asserting
that the new legislation can be effective, but only if the government builds capacity, and if the procedure allows a fair
opportunity for asylum applicants to be granted a credible
hearing.

As the title of this essay suggests, it has been “no easy walk” ensuring
adequate protection for refugees in South Africa. By all accounts this is
a “walk” far from fi nished. While South Africa has certainly not been a
stranger to refugee movements, particularly in its pre-1994 history, it only
recently established an asylum determination regime to assess applications
for refugee status on an individual basis. The development of a workable
structure for administering the regime has been complicated by a number
of factors, both policy- and capacity-related.
South Africa’s policy on refugees has its origins in the country’s
much-criticized Aliens Control Act (96 of 1991) (ACA), which in numerous
respects has failed to provide adequate guarantees to applicants (Human
Rights Watch 1998:170; Handmaker 1999a, 1999b). Until the recent imple-
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mentation of its fi rst-ever Refugees Act (Act 130 of 1998) in April 2000,
South Africa’s policy on refugees depended on the ACA, with the Department of Home Affairs responsible for enforcement.1 The ACA is an omnibus
piece of legislation, with its origins in British colonial policies of the early
twentieth century designed to restrict the number of immigrants to the
Union, especially from India (Peberdy and Crush 1998). The contents and
implementation of this Act have been roundly criticized, and its constitutionality seriously questioned (Klaaren 1996, 1998; Crush 1998; Klaaren
and Sprigman 2000).
The asylum system has always fit quite uncomfortably within the
country’s heavily criticized immigration regime (Klaaren and Sprigman
2000). There are not enough resources (especially staff) on hand to process the steadily increasing numbers of asylum applications. The number
of applications appears to have stabilized in recent years and cannot be
regarded as presenting a situation of “mass influx,” compared with other
countries on the continent (Handmaker 1999a:290). However limited the
number of staff, the majority of whom urgently need training, makes for a
cumbersome system which has consistently failed to achieve satisfactory
standards of administrative justice (Klaaren 1996; Kerfoot 2001).
This essay examines the process of refugee policy reform that began
in 1996. This process led to the country’s fi rst-ever Refugees Act in 1998.
The Act’s accompanying regulations were only released one and a half years
later in April 2000. More recently, the Chairperson of the Refugee Appeals
Board released the fi rst “Draft Rules” in June 2000, and the Ministry of
Home Affairs proposed a Refugees Amendment Bill and accompanying
explanatory Memorandum in 2001.2
This policy process has been extremely controversial, both in its
making and in the fi nal product, and it would be impossible to cover all
aspects of this in a single essay (but see Handmaker, de la Hunt, and Klaaren
2001). This article focuses instead on several particularly contentious issues,
notably temporary protection, repatriation, the proposal for containment of
refugees in “reception centers,” the arbitrariness of the refugee procedure
as it currently operates, and confl icts between the new refugee regime and
proposed migration policies.

Refugee Movements to South Africa
While South Africa has only recently developed a policy on refugees and
asylum, it has certainly been no stranger to displacement, generating and
receiving substantial numbers of forcibly displaced persons in its history.
One group of refugees consisted of those who fled South Africa as a consequence of persecution by the apartheid government. They lived in exile
mainly in neighboring countries, but also further afield. A second group
consisted of Mozambican refugees, victims of a destabilization campaign
(economic as well as military) by South Africa, which directly resulted in
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the civil war in that country (Human Rights Watch 1998:24). These displaced persons settled (illegally) in the former “homeland” areas of South
Africa (in particular Gazankulu and Kingwane). En route they faced great
physical risks that included a lethal electric fence, heavily armed soldiers,
and a wildlife reserve fi lled with dangerous animals (Human Rights Watch
1998:29).
After years of being systematically turned away, the UNHCR was
fi nally permitted to establish a presence in South Africa in 1991. Once it
gained a mandate to operate in South Africa, the UNHCR began addressing “durable solutions” for both the returning South African exiles, and an
estimated 300,000 Mozambicans who had fled the civil war in their country,
but had never been formally recognized by the South African government.
While the return of exiles involved a burdensome program of reintegration,
concerning in many cases the re-acquiring of South African citizenship,
the problems facing the former Mozambican refugees proved to be even
more complex.
To implement the program for former Mozambican refugees, the
UNHCR facilitated the establishment of a tripartite commission, in cooperation with the governments of South Africa (represented by the Department of Home Affairs) and Mozambique (Handmaker 1999a: 293). This
Commission recommended two “solutions.” The fi rst was for a repatriation
program, to be implemented in terms of a “Tripartite Agreement” between
the two governments and the UNHCR. This program was carried out under
the auspices of the UNHCR as the coordinating agency. The second recommendation was for “regularized status” to be granted to the former Mozambican refugees. Approval for this program was fi nally granted by the South
African cabinet in 1996. After extended delays, implementation began under
somewhat controversial circumstances in February 2000 (Handmaker and
Schneider 2002).
As the Mozambicans had never formally been recognized as refugees,
it was necessary for them to be retrospectively “recognized” for the purposes
of the time-limited repatriation program. Legal recognition was achieved
through a basic determination procedure that was contained in Passport
Control Instruction No. 20 of 1993, issued in terms of the Aliens Control
Act. This procedure for establishing the refugee status of Mozambicans laid
the basis for Passport Control Instruction No. 63 of 1994 which, together
with other instructions and a “Basic Agreement” signed by UNHCR and
South Africa, became the basis of South Africa’s pre-1998 refugee policy
(Handmaker 1999a:292–303).
The repatriation program failed to meet its own, modest goals (Dolan
1995), and was said by some to be the consequence of a “limited understanding of the pattern of refugees’ own flight and return movements” (Wilson and
Nunes 1994). The failure of the repatriation program to provide a “durable
solution” to the majority of Mozambican refugees meant that they ended up
once again in a “legal limbo.” At the time the cessation clause for Mozambican refugees was put in place on 31 December 1998, this group was thought
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to comprise a significant proportion of the undocumented migrants living
in South Africa (Human Rights Watch 1998:26).
Refugee movement to South Africa post-1990 has taken on a different
character to the “mass influx” previously seen from Mozambique. Not long
after the South African government introduced asylum determination procedures for individual applicants in 1993, a “trickle” of applicants began to
arrive. The flow increased steadily between 1995 and 1998, later leveling off
at approximately 20,000 per year (see Figure 1 and Table 1). Asylum-seekers
have come primarily from nearby countries such as Angola, and also from
the Great Lakes area (Zaire [DRC], Burundi, and Rwanda) and the Horn
(Sudan, Somalia, and Ethiopia). A smaller number have arrived from West
African countries, mainly Nigeria and Senegal, though also Côte d’Ivoire,
Cameroon, and other countries (see Table 2). A larger number of applicants
have been arriving from India and Pakistan. In June 2000, they made up
eighteen percent of the total applications received, and thirty-one percent
of applicants rejected (see Table 3). Bearing in mind the current backlog,
approved applications to date have overwhelmingly (eighty-eight percent)
been from three countries perceived to be “refugee generating,” namely
Somalia, Angola, and Zaire/Democratic Republic of Congo (see Table 4).
While the reasons remain speculative, many in official circles hold the
view that the majority of applicants are bogus, and have accordingly introduced a variety of restrictive policies. The latest of these policies restricts
asylum-seekers from work or study. While there has undoubtedly been abuse
of the system, the introduction of a “white list” has been resisted by NGOs
who challenge the implicit assumption that any one country can be considered “safe,” particularly in relation to individuals targeted for persecution.
Alternatively, there have been calls for an improvement in the efficiency of
the Department of Home Affairs’ management of the asylum determination
procedure, which has so far led to incredibly long delays, and a substantial
backlog in applications. In combination with a cumbersome, inefficient,
and restrictive migration and immigration policy and implementation, this
has led to a situation where migrants (many of whom are highly skilled)
seek residence in South Africa through the asylum system, irrespective of
whether they may be suffering persecution.

Toward a Refugee Act: From Control to Protection
The fi rst proposal to introduce refugee legislation came about in 1996, with
the preparation of an initial Draft Refugee Bill by the Department of Home
Affairs (DHA) (Al-Omari 1996). This was followed by the circulation of a
Second Draft Bill which received substantial critical commentary (de la
Hunt 1996; Hathaway 1996; McNamara and Morjane 1996), and was the
subject of a workshop in November 1996, organized by Lawyers for Human
Rights, the Wits Refugee Research Program, and the South African Human
Rights Commission. Various refugee rights advocates, the UNHCR, law-
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yers, academics, and senior representatives of the Department of Home
Affairs attended the workshop, held at the offices of the Commission.
Civil society was at this stage beginning to get organized, having
formed Refugee Forums in the provinces, and a Refugee Rights Consortium
to lobby at the national level. The DHA also showed itself, at the outset, to
be open to criticism and debate 3 by its circulation of proposed policy documents, participation in the November 1996 Workshop, and other meetings
with civil society representatives. Following the November Workshop,
however, the departmental process was subsequently put on hold, pending
the appointment of a Task Team by the Minister of Home Affairs. The Task
Team produced a Draft Green Paper on International Migration in May 1997
(Republic of South Africa 1997). The Green Paper devoted a whole chapter
to the refugee issue.
The Green Paper recommendations on refugee policy were heavily
influenced by the work of the international Reformulation of Refugee Law
Project.4 The proposals were commented on by various organizations and
government departments, providing feedback from a wide range of perspectives that raised a number of substantive concerns. Particular attention was
focused on the Green Paper’s recommendations for temporary protection
(discussed later in this article): its stated “solution-orientation” and proposals for “burden-sharing” within the region (UNHCR 1997; Rutinwa 1997;
Handmaker 1998, 1999a:299–304; Handmaker, de la Hunt, and Klaaren
2001).
The Green Paper also recommended separate policy processes for
migration and refugees. Despite pressures from civil society and a major
conference in August 1997 organized by the Southern African Migration
Project and the Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on Home Affairs, further
progress was slow. This situation prompted Lawyers for Human Rights to
organize a refugee policy conference in March 1998. Finally, in May 1998,
the Department of Home Affairs appointed a Refugees White Paper Task
Team.
The Task Team, which consisted of members from the Department,
civil society and UNHCR, was provided with a Working Draft White Paper
and Refugee Bill drafted by the DHA. This working draft of the bill closely
resembled the problematic Second Draft Bill circulated in 1996, indicating
that little progress had been made within the DHA in the interim. However,
the White Paper Task Team was also under a mandate to draw reference from
the recommendations of the Draft Green Paper, even though the government
had made it clear in October 1997 that the document should only be considered for “discussion purposes.” In other words, the fi rst process (which began
in 1996 with the fi rst Draft Refugee Bill) and the second process (beginning
with the Green Paper) were fi nally consolidated into a single process.
A major difference at this stage in the policy process was that civil
society organizations were now quite well organized. The National Consortium on Refugee Affairs (NCRA), a national network of South African
NGOs (policy specialists, service providers, legal practitioners, and refugee
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representatives) and representatives from UNHCR and government (including the Border Police and the Department of Home Affairs) was founded in
October 1997. By the time the Refugees White Paper Task Team was constituted, the NCRA had established a “legal affairs subcommittee,” which
organized at least two workshops and other, smaller meetings during the
course of the Task Team’s meetings. Several Task Team members were from
organizations represented on the NCRA. Thus, it was possible to engage a
larger body of input to the policy process.
Based on the recommendations of the Task Team, the DHA presented
the Refugees White Paper to the public in a relatively short space of time
on 19 June 1998 (Republic of South Africa 1998). The Department received
public submissions, and the Task Team met again to consider them and
make further amendments and recommendations to the Draft White Paper
and Refugees Bill. These in turn were presented to the Parliamentary
Portfolio Committee on Home Affairs. However, before the Committee
received these documents, the State Law Advisors office extensively revised
the Draft Bill, making changes to the refugee defi nition (which originally
had repeated that contained in the International Conventions) and providing a more restrictive approach to determination. Again, the NCRA made
extensive submissions, including a document of “joint concerns,” presented
to the Portfolio Committee in October of 1998.
The Portfolio Committee’s amendments to the Draft Bill eventually
resulted in the Refugees Act being passed by a consensus of the National
Assembly on 5 November 1998. Notwithstanding certain unresolved concerns over its content, it was encouraging to note the broad-based political
support for the Bill, and to witness a much-needed legislative change, prior
to the 1999 general election. Following assent by the Council of Provinces
on 20 November, the Bill became law when President Nelson Mandela gave
his signature on 2 December 1998. However, enthusiasm over the new legislation quickly turned to frustration, as the Act did not come immediately
into force. Hence, the asylum determination regime continued to be administered in terms of the Aliens Control Act, with all of its accompanying
problems (Klaaren 2000).
The Regulations to the Refugees Act were eventually issued by the
Department of Home Affairs in April 2000. While the bringing into force
of the Refugees Act was much welcomed, this was overshadowed by the
contents of the Regulations themselves. These again raised concerns over
implementation and the rights which refugees and refugee applicants ought
to be entitled to, both during the course of the determination procedure,
and following the granting of refugee status. The Refugee Appeals Board’s
Draft Rules, released in June 2000 were less contentious.
The list of enduring concerns still challenging the adequacy of refugee
protection in South Africa is extensive. While the South African government deserves some praise for including a good representation of civil society organizations in the Task Team, the NCRA proved itself very effective

in ensuring that many substantive policy concerns were addressed in the
fi nal legislation. But other concerns remain high on the agenda.

Debates over Temporary Protection
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Temporary protection is an issue that fi rst attracted major attention in the
discussions around the Green Paper and has continued to generate critical
debate, which has not always been very constructive, arising both out of
conceptual misunderstanding and major differences in perspective. From
the very beginning, there has been considerable political resistance in South
Africa to refugee integration. The granting of refugee status has, since its
inception, been temporary. Beginning with the former Mozambican refugees, it has always proved much easier (politically) to justify a program for
refugee repatriation than one regularizing their status and integrating them
into the South African community (Handmaker and Schneider 2002). Following the Mozambican repatriation program, and with the introduction of
asylum determination procedures on an individual basis in 1994, it became
quite clear that the government was reluctant to grant a more permanent
status to refugees (Handmaker 1999a:299). However, the Refugees Act provided (in Section 27c) that a refugee: “is entitled to apply for an immigration
permit . . . after five years’ continuous residence in the Republic from the
date on which he or she was granted asylum, if the Standing Committee
certifies that he or she will remain a refugee indefi nitely.”
This provision has yet to be fully tested, and is likely to prove controversial, not least because it is notoriously difficult to ascertain whether
a refugee will remain so indefi nitely, though situations that lead to refugee
status rarely resolve themselves within a period of five years (Handmaker
1998:7, 1997:967).
The Green Paper insisted that it did “not endorse an understanding
of refugee protection as an alternative means to immigrate permanently to
South Africa” (4.2.2). No commentator fundamentally disagreed with this
statement. However, some maintained that, notwithstanding inevitable
abuse of the procedure, attempts to stay integration in all cases until after
five years (given that a significant number already experienced long delays
in the determination procedure) would be inhumane. Furthermore, such
a measure would be contrary to domestic and international human rights
standards (Handmaker 1999a:301–2). Others, including Rutinwa (1997, 2001),
more generally questioned the viability of the general model proposed by the
Green Paper. He claimed that “its elements were influenced by the negative
attitudes of western states towards refugees after the cold war.” Rutinwa
further questioned whether the Green Paper was, as it maintained, “rights
regarding” (Rutinwa 1997:16).
Advocates of the Green Paper model, including Barutciski (1998),
argued that such concerns relied on “false” comparisons with the applica-
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tion of temporary protection in Europe, which he said was “characterized by
the absence of individualized status determinations because they involved
perceived mass inflows. Protection was granted to groups deemed to require
protection, rather than individuals determined to satisfy the criteria for
refugee status” (Barutciski 1998: 713).
However, Barutciski’s description of temporary protection in Europe
actually very closely describes how asylum determination procedures operate in practice in South Africa. Despite the limited number of applications
received, the government nevertheless seems to believe that the country
is experiencing a “mass inflow,” and has expressed its desire to introduce
reception centers (see below). The government’s concern appears to be
related more to a seriously under-resourced department than anything else.
Further, applications relating to individual persecution take many years to
decide, and are often rejected on unsustainable grounds (Kerfoot 2000). It
is now fairly well established that the large majority of positive decisions
granting refugee status in South Africa are based either on assumptions of
whether a country is “refugee generating” and falling within the broader
OAU defi nition (van Beek 2001) or considered “safe.”5 Those involved with
the Reformulation Project, which formed the basis of the model laid out
in Chapter 4 of the Green Paper, maintain that there is no prohibition in
the international refugee conventions against temporary protection, more
particularly:
The temporary nature of the obligation to provide protection
is most explicit in the permission the Convention grants
states to revoke refugee status whenever there is effective and
meaningful change in a refugee’s country of origin, such that
the need for protection no longer exists. (Hathaway 1997b)

Barutciski (1998:705) alleges that arguing for the automatic integration
of refugees is tantamount to advocating permanent residence for undocumented migrants. In one respect, this allegation can be rejected on the
grounds that to acknowledge abuse of the asylum procedure cannot justify
restrictive measures against all asylum applicants (Handmaker 1999a:301).
That aside, those determined to abuse asylum procedures are in any event
rarely deterred by measures which aim to diminish “pull” factors through
punitive measures, as opposed to measures which address “root causes”
(Ghosh 1998:147). The justification for this allegation perhaps stemmed
from Barutciski’s later assertion that “limited rights apparently encourage
a more liberal policy in situations of mass inflow, while elaborate rights
that may lead to integration tend to discourage governments from allowing
refugees to access their territories” (Barutciski 1998:714).
However, the asylum determination procedure in South Africa and,
indeed, the rule of law in general, has for some time operated in a climate
where rights entitlement (particularly prior to 1994) has traditionally been
quite limited, and indeed is constantly being tested. Yet the asylum pro-
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cedure has, by turns, become more and more restrictive. In other words,
there has been no apparent “nexus” established in South Africa between a
limited rights regime, and the liberalizing of asylum procedures. In fact, the
primary issue that locally based commentators have been concerned with
concerns the lack of basic administrative justice in the administration procedure itself (Klaaren 1996, 2000). In the absence of legal representation, it
was urgently felt that the system needed to include adequate checks against
administrative unfairness, since the consequences of a wrong decision in
the procedure could very well amount to further persecution as rejected
claimants were returned to their countries of origin (Kerfoot 2000).
A further argument put forward challenging the viability of “temporary protection” concerned the “psycho-social risk” to refugees, an aspect
of protection that the Green Paper also acknowledged (Republic of South
Africa 1997:4.6.7) but did not elaborate. In this sense, the period in which
one’s status in a country was uncertain could itself give rise to concern.
Psychologists have concluded that a prolonged period of uncertainty in one’s
residential status can result in considerable psychosocial harm to refugees
(Silove 1997).
In short, the question as to whether the Green Paper model of refugee protection would realistically address the concerns over the flaws in
refugee protection in the existing system was seriously questioned on the
grounds of existing administrative practice and human rights. While asylum
determination in many crucial respects “mirrors” that of Europe, a major
exception is that procedures in the north do tend to become more “visible”
as they are more frequently challenged through the legal system. The reason
for this is that applicants in the north are often granted legal representation,
something which is nearly impossible in South Africa at the moment. From
another perspective, some commentators rejected the temporary protection
model proposed by the Green Paper, since it was clearly founded on the
(unsustainable) assumption that protection for the duration of risk, followed
by repatriation was necessarily the “best solution.”
It has been noted that “most refugee movements have tended to result
in permanent exile of the displaced populations” (Rogge 1994). In recent
years, the notion of repatriation as the “best solution” has been challenged,
with some arguing that why refugees might want to return home is as
important, if not more so, than how they return (Bakewell 1998). Others
maintain that repatriations are often impossible to satisfactorily implement, since programs often ignore the causes which led to displacement
in the fi rst place (Voutira 1998). Finally repatriations and migrant return
programs are in many cases undertaken in circumstances where “conditions of absolute safety” are seriously questioned (Handmaker 1997). Even
the UNHCR, which is traditionally very much in favor of repatriation as a
solution, has recently advocated in favor of local integration, particularly
for “urban-based” refugees (Geddo 2001).
In short, it is no longer realistic to assume that repatriation or return is
the ideal solution, though there may well be occasions in which repatriation

or return can be a viable solution, provided that programs are conducted in
conditions of dignity and recognize certain practical obstacles (Handmaker
1999b). Such programs ought to at least benefit from past experience, recognizing that “repatriation is anything but problem free” (Rogge 1994:22).

A Conflict between “Reformulation” and Pragmatism?
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The disagreement over temporary protection and repatriation might best
be explained as a dispute between those who endorsed a “reformulated”
approach to refugee protection, as reflected in Chapter 4 of the Green Paper,
and those who put forward pragmatic arguments grounded in the highly
problematic local situation. Put another way, on one side there were those
who advocated a model of refugee protection founded on an approach that it
was better to liberalize refugee determination procedures, extending protection to a greater number of persons on a temporary basis (Hathaway 1997b
and 2001; Barutciski 1998). On the other side, there were those who felt
that the refugee procedure ought to be fi rmly rooted in the administrative
and constitutional culture rapidly emerging in South Africa, and endorsed
a “decentralized hearing-based system” (Klaaren and Sprigman 2000). This
position was supported by others who felt strongly that the product of legislation ought to recognize the special “historical context” in which asylum
procedures have been created and implemented (Handmaker 1999a:308).
Still others felt more strongly that the model contained in Chapter 4 was
“unsuitable for adoption” because it was “not informed by the experience
of the region” (Rutinwa 1997:2).
Arguably the two strongest commentators on the temporary protection issue in South Africa have been Professor Jim Hathaway, now at the
University of Michigan, and Dr. Bonaventure Rutinwa of the Centre for
Forced Migration at the University of Dar Es Salaam, both of whom played
very important roles in formal discussions on the process of refugee policy
reform.
In his paper delivered at the March 1998 Refugee Conference, organized
by Lawyers for Human Rights in Pretoria, Professor Hathaway acknowledged the concerns referred to above, by questioning whether temporary
protection of refugees should be seen as a “threat or solution” (Hathaway
2001). Hathaway argued in favor of a “decisive and practical reinvigoration
of refugee law,” for a more collective and “solution oriented” approach, and
a more deliberate distinction between immigration and refugee protection.
Hathaway further argued that “the refugee protection system was never
intended to be a mechanism that generates solutions, but is instead a palliative regime that protects desperate people until and unless a fundamental
change of circumstances makes it safe for them to go home.”
Arguing against “routine admission of all refugees to permanency,”
Hathaway argued that such a view “holds refugees hostage to a major proj-
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ect of social transformation,” also stating that “the basic protective role of
refugee protection should not be a captive” in debates over whether refugees
ought to be entitled to permanent residence, which in South Africa he felt
was “absolutist” in its orientation (Hathaway 2001). Hathaway felt that the
model in Chapter 4 of the Green Paper was “seriously misunderstood.” Like
Hathaway, Dr. Rutinwa also recognized the “crisis of the refugee protection
regime,” but is of a different view when it comes to resolving it. Rutinwa
argued at the March 1998 Policy Conference that the rights of refugees under
temporary protection have differed considerably from state to state, though
they clearly intend for refugees ultimately to be repatriated.
While acknowledging that the reformulation of refugee law project
has made a “significant contribution” to debates on refugee policy, Rutinwa
objected to the grounds and assumptions on which the “reformulation
model” is based (Rutinwa 2001). In particular, Rutinwa took issue with
the proposal for “collectivized” solutions, maintaining that its relevance is
confi ned to only a few areas where refugee flows are focused, and that states
will only cooperate “if the cost of noncooperation [is] higher” (Koser, Walsh,
and Black 1998). More strongly, Rutinwa (2001) maintained that the effect of
splitting fiscal and actual responsibility between (rich) northern and (much
poorer) southern countries would amount to a “global apartheid” (Chimni
1998). In the end, both sides on the reformulation/pragmatist divide agreed
that refugee protection ought to be provided to those who need it, yet there
was substantial disagreement as to how, and especially at what cost, this
was to be achieved. The 1998 Refugees Act attempts to steer a path between
these confl icting views.
Interestingly, a similar message came through at the Workshop on
Temporary Protection at the Seventh IRAP Conference in South Africa on
7 January 2001. While the workshop focused largely on the operation of
temporary protection in the European Union, it sought to clarify a number
of issues concerning temporary protection generally, ranging from “defi nitions and approach” to “complementary protection of nonrefugees.”
While there were no concrete conclusions to the vigorous discussions
that took place in the workshop, what emerged was an almost completely
polarized debate between essentially two positions. On the one hand, there
were those who felt that the future of refugee protection depended on a
“principled” recognition that states were generally reluctant to offer refugee
status to persons and would only do so under circumstances where refugees
received a time-limited protected status, one of their arguments being that
if there was a “guarantee of quality, how would non-permanency offend?”
On the other hand, there were those who resisted the imposition of temporary protection as a matter-of-course on the grounds that such a status was
dangerously insecure and that it was pressuring states to repatriate. In their
view, states’ reluctance to extend refugee protection to those who need it
has long been a problem requiring constant vigilance and advocacy, and one
that would not be resolved by a “political buy-in.”

Containment: Proposed Reception Centers
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Section 35(1) of the Refugees Act allows for the designation of “areas, centres
or places” for the temporary reception of asylum-seekers or refugees in situations of “mass influx.” In 1999, the Department of Home Affairs released
a “Discussion Document” to civil society organizations and UNHCR, proposing the establishment of “Reception Centres,” where asylum-seekers
would be required to stay while their applications for asylum were being
processed (Department of Home Affairs 1999). This document was informed
by a desire to “curtail rampant corruption, crime, and abuse, that have
made the refugee program in South Africa a backdoor for illegal migration
by persons seeking primarily economic betterment.” The government went
on to say that “it is therefore understood that decisive measures should be
taken, consistent with international refugee law and protection principles,
to curb such abuse and restore the credibility of the institution of asylum”
(Department of Home Affairs 1999:1).
Ostensibly, the proposal aims to reduce the “pull factors,” which allegedly cause irregular migration to the country. This approach is consistent
with the proposal in the White Paper on International Migration (Republic
of South Africa 1999:4.2.1) that the government could “prevent illegal migration” by “reducing pull factors” through punitive measures, an approach
described recently by a leading commentator as quite ineffective in stemming the flow of irregular migration (Ghosh 1998).
The intention of the government was to get civil society organizations to endorse this proposal, with the view to have centers established in
far-off, rural areas (van Garderen 1999b:14). Instead, the proposal has faced
strong resistance, particularly from human rights organizations who feel
that the project is not feasible, not least on economic grounds (van Garderen 1999a:3). It is also felt that the establishment of centers would “have
serious implications on some of the fundamental rights currently enjoyed
by asylum-seekers.” From an administrative law point of view, the main
contention against centers has been that the provision of the Act ought only
to be used in circumstances of a sudden “mass influx” (van Garderen 1999a:
3) which, in the current situation, is clearly not the case.

Discussion Document, 1999
The Discussion Document requires that there be a “maximum delay of four
months” (Department of Home Affairs 1999:4). However, as commentators
have noted (Dutch Refugee Council 1997; van Garderen 1999a:3; Jenkins
and de la Hunt 2000), the period of time in which one is normally confi ned
to a reception center, which is dependent on the efficiency of the asylum
determination procedure, is very often longer. It is very common for asylumseekers to be in such centers for one year, or even longer, as it is inextricably

linked to (often lengthy) asylum procedures (Dutch Refugee Council 1997:
3). Freedom of movement concerns and fi nancial considerations aside, given
the current state of the asylum determination procedure in South Africa
(where decisions can take up to three years) it would not seem advisable
(even in terms of the Department’s own, stated principles) to introduce
reception centers.
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As many commentators have noted, the asylum determination procedure in
South Africa is characterized by a high degree of arbitrariness, which fails
to achieve acceptable standards of administrative justice (Klaaren 1996;
Handmaker 1999a:295; Klaaren and Sprigman 2000; Kerfoot 2000). Applications tend to be decided favorably with regard to the general conditions
in certain countries perceived as “refugee generating,” or rejected on the
grounds that conditions are perceived as “safe”—in other words on a “group”
basis, rather than on individual assessment (van Beek 2001; Klaaren 2000).
Indeed, eighty-five percent of positive decisions on applications favor three
countries, namely Angola, (former) Zaire, and Somalia, and only 141 applications out of 5,000 from Somalians have been rejected outright or declared
manifestly unfounded as of April 2001. At the same time, the majority of
rejected applicants have been from four countries: India, Senegal, Pakistan,
and Nigeria.
Concerns over administrative justice have been central to the concerns of a number of refugee groups and practitioners, who are fi rmly of
the view that consideration of country situations in general provides more
persuasive criteria in making determinations than the individual experiences of asylum-seekers (Kerfoot 2000). While there have been few lawyers
in South Africa able, let alone willing, to take up the cases of asylum applicants who claim their rights have been infringed, the few cases which have
reached the courts have established important precedents (Kerfoot 2000).
Other concerns over the procedure include: the interviewing process
(including the absence of qualified translators); inadequate access to country information; and the sheer lack of staff available to conduct interviews
and make determinations. These are in most respects resource and training
issues which urgently need to be corrected. However, the structure of the
procedure itself causes serious problems, up to and including the appeals
procedure. This is a policy question. In order to address this, two approaches
toward asylum determination have been recommended. One approach,
recommended by the Green Paper, argued for a “streamlined, one-step
investigatory status determination procedure” (Republic of South Africa
1997: 4.4.2), endorsed by those who favored a “reformulation” of refugee
law. The other approach, endorsed by locally based organizations, favored a
“hearings-based” determination procedure (Klaaren and Sprigman 2000).
Ultimately, the Refugees Act adopted the latter, yet it remains to be seen
how this will operate in practice.
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The 1999 Discussion Document has since been superseded by a proposed
Refugees Amendment Bill, released at the beginning of 2001 along with an
explanatory “Memorandum.” The Bill aimed to do two things: fi rst to provide a legislative framework for the introduction of government-run Reception Centers for asylum-seekers in South Africa and, second, to introduce
legal mechanisms for the purposes of restrictively interpreting the extension
of refugee status in terms of the Refugee Act 1998.
It is abundantly clear that the amendments proposed by this Bill would
not only fail to stand up to a constitutional challenge, but would violate
fundamental principles of international law. Indeed, one of the restrictive
mechanisms proposed, namely the Department of Home Affairs’ erstwhile
policy of refusing admission to asylum applicants who passed through a
purportedly “safe third country,” was recently (and successfully) challenged
by way of a legal case taken up by Lawyers for Human Rights in May 2001.6
Soon afterwards, the Minister of Home Affairs publicly called the Director
General to task for “implementing a legally questionable asylum policy
without his knowledge.”7
Thus, judging by recent events, the proposal to introduce reception
centers for asylum-seekers in South Africa will at the very least be delayed
for some time. It is hoped that South Africa will take due warning of the
dreadful experience of compulsory detention of asylum-seekers in other
countries and scrap the idea altogether, an idea which, in the opinion of
two researchers who have comprehensively researched the subject, “would
constitute the fourth successive trauma” experienced in South Africa (Jenkins and de la Hunt 2000:63).

Contradictions between Refugee and Migration Policy
The Draft White Paper on International Migration was released in April
1999, nearly two years after the Green Paper was produced. It was followed
in February 2000 by a Draft Immigration Bill. Even though the Green Paper
specifically recommended separate White Papers for refugees and migration generally (Republic of South Africa 1997:1.5.7), and the White Paper
indicated that it “would not deal with the issue of refugees” (Republic of
South Africa 1999:3.3), it was clear that refugees would be affected by the
migration policy, particularly the provisions on border control (Handmaker
1999c:4).
The White Paper dwells at some length on the concept of the “community,” though the term is not specifically defi ned. By implication, it appears
to be a “citizen-based” concept, calling on South Africans to understand the
distinction between different types of foreigners and tolerate, perhaps even
to accommodate, but not integrate “noncommunity” members (Handmaker
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1999c:4). Further, the White Paper calls on the “community” to assist in
the enforcement of the country’s migration control systems, suggesting that
one would be a “good citizen” by reporting anyone suspected of being without legal residence to the authorities. In the words of the White Paper, the
“community” would be “responsible for cooperating with internal policing
actions to ensure that illegal immigrants are not attracted to South Africa”
(Republic of South Africa 1999:4.4.1).
The White Paper drafters clearly anticipated that such administrative
separation might cause some tensions, and thus further proposed that public
education programs be undertaken on xenophobia. As the White Paper put it,
one of the government’s priorities would be “ensuring that education is provided at community level to avoid any form of xenophobia by making communities understand the tragedy of illegal immigration while co-operating
with law enforcement authorities” (Republic of South Africa 1999:6.5).
Apart from the proven ineffectiveness of such punitive approaches to
border control (Ghosh 1998:147), concerns over xenophobia are becoming
ever more pressing. Refugees and other migrants in South Africa have, in
recent years, been subject to multiple attacks on xenophobic grounds, some
instances of which have received considerable attention (Human Rights
Watch 1998).8 It is unlikely that this approach will do anything to stem the
rise in xenophobia, particularly with regard to refugees who because of linguistic, cultural, and other differences tend to be far more visible than other
migrants. If anything, such an approach will split “communities” further
and exacerbate the current levels of xenophobia, perhaps even leading to a
new kind of “vigilantism” (Lawyers for Human Rights 1999:4).
A significant criticism of the proposed policy and the Draft Immigration Bill was that it effectively brings refugee protection “back within the
ambit of migration control,” rather than distinguishing between the two
(Klaaren 2000). In the case of general border control issues this distinction
is certainly important, yet of more limited direct consequence. In terms of
the asylum determination regime and the migration regime, such a distinction is very important indeed. Both the White Paper and Immigration Bill
delved further into issues specifically affecting refugees than they should
have. The Bill even insists that it take “precedence” over the Refugees Act
in the event of confl ict (Republic of South Africa 2000:Schedule 3).
In this regard, inconsistencies between the Refugees Act and the
Immigration Bill become highly relevant. For example, the White Paper
and the Immigration Bill both refer to “repatriation,” a term in international
law with specific legal meaning attached to refugees (as opposed to migrants
in general). Indeed, respected commentators have stressed that (voluntary)
repatriation carries with it a responsibility on the part of the international
community to fi nd solutions for refugees, while at the same time ensuring
that the “interests of individuals and communities” are not disregarded
(Goodwin-Gill 1996:271).

Conclusion
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Politicians in South Africa have been criticized for using the broader issue
of migration for political gain (Human Rights Watch 1998:123). Whatever
criticisms one might levy against the government, it cannot be denied that
politicians face considerable policy hurdles, which have yet to be overcome,
coupled with an administration that is currently incapable, both in terms of
numbers and training, of handling the (gradually) rising number of asylum
applications.
Migration policies that have their origins in the government’s attempts
to exclude certain categories of persons will have little constructive effect
in stemming the flow of migrants. Rather, an inclusive approach toward
categories of persons whose skills are so urgently needed in South Africa,
and a recognition of the “circular” nature of much contemporary migration, will go a long way toward redressing the negative trends of the Aliens
Control Act, which have so often led to acrimony between civil society and
government, rather than a constructive discussion of possible solutions.
With regard to refugees, it can be argued that differences of opinion
and perspectives among various civil society commentators have played a
role in stimulating the search for a practical, efficient, yet rights-respecting
determination procedure. There is nevertheless a real need for additional
research. The principle of refugee protection is, as the government rightly
states, derived from constitutional and international obligations. Indeed,
this principle ought to ensure the integrity of refugee protection over and
above considerations on migration in general. But there is a moral imperative
as well, and distinguishing the justification for a fair and rights-regarding
procedure on the basis of “principle” rather than “goodwill” is difficult to
sustain in the current global climate, when the need for protection from
human rights violations is as urgent as it as ever been.9

NOTES

1.

The Department of Home Affairs carries a great deal of “institutional baggage.” Previously,
the Department was responsible for enforcing the notorious “pass laws” and “Group Areas
Act,” key features of the previous government’s policy of apartheid.

2.

Draft Refugee Affairs Appeal Board (Procedure) Rules 2000 are available at www.lhr.org.za/
refugee/appboard.htm

3.

This situation, unfortunately, changed following the deliberations of the Green Paper Task
Team. The policy debate was effectively “stalled” until May 1998.

4.

The Reformulation of Refugee Law Project was funded by the Ford and MacArthur Foundations and based for its duration at the Centre for Refugee Studies, York University, Canada;
see Hathaway (1997a, 1997b). Professor James Hathaway of York University was a consultant
to the Green Paper Task Team.

5.

The 1969 OAU Convention on the specific aspects of refugee problems in Africa provides a
broader definition of a refugee, extending to situations “. . . owing to external aggression,

occupation, foreign domination or events seriously disturbing public order” Art. I(2), 1000
UNTS (United Nations Treaty Series) 46; South Africa acceded to this Convention on 15
December 1995. This trend appears to be leading to the creation of a “white list” of countries.
In the words of the Deputy Minister of Home Affairs, “We will draw up a list of countries we
recognize as democracies, and we expect that people from those countries won’t need to
come to SA as refugees” Cape Times, 19 April 2000.
LHR v. Minister of Home Affairs, Case No.10783/2001, Pretoria Local Division.

7.

Staff Reporter. Buthelezi accuses Masetlha. Business Day, 25 April 2001

8.

One particularly publicized incident concerned the murders of three asylum-seekers on a
train between Johannesburg and Pretoria. See: “Train from hell to Irene Station,” Pretoria
News, 4 September 1998. Subsequent articles were critical of the public’s response, including
“Public accused of being soft on mob killings,” Sunday Independent (SA), 6 September 1998.
This incident was also reported in the international press, including the UK Independent on
On the day the Refugees Act was passed through South Africa’s parliament, the Deputy Minof our constitutional and international obligations. We do so as a matter of principle, not as
matter of goodwill, and we are not doing anyone a favor” (Hansard, Proceedings of Extended
Public Committee—Chamber of the National Assembly, 5 November 1998, at page 7751,
South Africa.)
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Table 1
Refugee Applications in South Africa, 1995–2001
Source

Dated

UNHCR
May 1995
(State of the World’s Refugees)

Received

Approved Refused*

Outstanding

3,644

383

517

2,744
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DHA/UNHCR
(recorded figures)

June 1996

16,967

1,915

5,649

9,403

DHA/UNHCR
(recorded figures)

August 1997

32,510

4,002

6,118

22,390

November 1998

47,612

7,927

19,031

20,654

DHA/UNHCR
(recorded figures)

June 1999

54,759

8,504

25,020

21,235

DHA/UNHCR
(recorded figures)

April 2000

60,278

15,006

29,219

16,053

DHA/UNHCR
(recorded figures)

April 2001

64,341

17,198

34,184

12,959

DHA**
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*Refused includes: Rejected, cancelled, referred, extended, withdrawn or manifestly
unfounded applications.
**Speech by Deputy Minister of Home Affairs to Parliament, 5 November 1998.

Table 2
Receipt of Refugee Applications by Country of Origin, to April 2001
Country

11.9
10.7
9.9
9.3
8.3
8.2
7.0
5.0
3.2
2.5
2.3
2.2
2.2
2.0
1.9
13.4
86.6
100.0
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7,677
6,859
6,385
5,952
5,336
5,302
4,507
3,239
2,031
1,618
1,473
1,441
1,400
1,310
1,203
8,608
55,733
64,341
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Zaire/DRC
Angola
India
Somalia
Pakistan
Nigeria
Senegal
Ethiopia
Burundi
Congo-Brazzaville
Tanzania
Bulgaria
Ghana
Bangladesh
Rwanda
Others
Top 15
TOTAL

%
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1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15

Number

Source: UNHCR/Department of Home Affairs.

Table 3
Rejected Applications, to April 2001
Country

Number

% Total

% Applications

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

5,625
4,338
4,174
3,686
1,934
1,640
1,217
1,076
946
868
6,695
32,199

17.5
13.5
13.0
11.4
6.0
5.1
3.8
3.3
2.9
2.7
20.8
100.0

88.1
81.8
78.2
81.8
59.7
23.9
n/a
n/a
72.2
58.9
n/a
50.0

India
Nigeria
Pakistan
Senegal
Ethiopia
Angola
Bulgaria
Ghana
Bangladesh
Tanzania
Others
TOTAL

Source: UNHCR/Department of Home Affairs.

Table 4
Approved Applications, to April 2001
Country
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1
2
3
4
5
6

Somalia
Zaire/DRC
Angola
Burundi
Congo-Brazzaville
Rwanda
Others
TOTAL

Number

% Total

% Applications

5,330
4,886
4,471
941
661
604
305
17,198

31.0
28.4
26.0
5.8
3.8
3.5
1.5
100.0

89.5
63.6
65.2
46.3
40.9
50.2

Source: UNHCR/Department of Home Affairs.
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Figure 1: Applications Received to Date (1995-2001)
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